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INTRODUCTION 
In the first issue of her opening appellate brief filed on August 8, 1994, 
defendant-appellant Deanne R. Jex ("Jex") identified two plain errors committed by the trial 
court in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Paul J. Roach ("Roach"): 
(1) basing summary judgment on Roach's incomplete "Statement of Undisputed Facts" — the 
second page of which was never presented to the trial court; and (2) basing summary 
judgment on Roach's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" which fails to contain any supporting 
reference to the record. 
On August 23, 1994, Roach moved the Utah Supreme Court to summarily 
dismiss Jex's first issue on the grounds that it was not included in Jex's original docketing 
statement and was not raised below. Jex responded that the trial court's record had not 
become available for review until after her docketing statement was due. Therefore, Jex did 
not learn that the trial court had improperly relied upon Roach's incomplete "Statement of 
Undisputed Facts" until after her docketing statement had been filed. Jex also responded that 
because both errors identified in her first issue constituted plain error by the trial court, it 
was unnecessary for her to have raised that issue below. The Utah Supreme Court denied 
Roach's motion for summary disposition and granted Jex an opportunity to amend her 
docketing statement.17 
This case was then poured-over on September 21, 1994 to this Court for 
disposition. On September 23, 1994, Roach moved this Court to summarily dismiss Jex's 
- Jex amended her docketing statement on September 19, 1994. 
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first issue once again arguing that it was not raised below. Once again, Jex responded that 
because both errors identified in her first issue constituted plain error by the trial court, it 
was unnecessary for her to have raised that issue below. On October 19, 1994, this Court 
denied Roach's second motion for summary disposition. 
On October 24, 1994, Roach filed in the trial court a Motion to Correct or 
Modify the Record under Utah R. App. P. 11(h). While Roach admitted that the second 
page of his "Statement of Undisputed Facts" was indeed missing from the record, he chose 
not to file an affidavit attesting that the missing page was in fact filed. Instead, he took the 
curious approach of shifting that burden to the trial court by arguing, "This Court simply 
would not have ruled as it did had a whole page of Roach's memorandum been missing, and 
therefore the documents before the Court must have been complete."-7 
The trial court was apparently moved by Roach's self-serving vote of 
confidence. On November 10, 1994, the trial court held, contrary to its own record, that it 
now recalls having received and reviewed the second page of Roach's "Statement of 
Undisputed Facts" almost two years ago.-7 
- A copy of Roach's Memorandum in Support of Motion To Modify Or Correct the 
Record without accompanying exhibits is attached hereto as Addendum "H." 
Jex opposed this motion arguing that the record speaks for itself. A copy of Jex's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Correct or Modify the Record is attached hereto as 
Addendum "I." 
-' A copy of the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order dated November 10, 1994, 
is attached hereto as Addendum "J." 
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History having now been "corrected" by the trial court, the first plain error 
identified in Jex's first issue is presumably no longer a part of this appeal. This "correction" 
of the record, however, does not defeat Jex's appeal. In fact, it does not even eliminate the 
first issue raised on appeal since Roach's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" remains 
unsupported by any reference to the record. Therefore, this Court still has the opportunity to 
show that two wrongs do not make a right. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER JEX OBJECTED TO THE REMAINING ERROR IDENTIFIED IN 
HER FIRST ISSUE IS IRRELEVANT SINCE IT CONSTITUTED PLAIN 
ERROR. 
A. Plain Error 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently discussed the three elements necessary 
to establish plain error: 
To establish the existence of plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an 
alleged error that was not properly objected to, the appellant must show the 
following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the 
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant . . . . 
State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added).^ 
-
1
 The plain error rule is also recognized in the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party 
is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a 
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific 
(continued...) 
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The plain error rule assumes that the error was not properly objected to below. 
Therefore, it is irrelevant whether Jex objected to Roach's unsupported "Statement of 
Undisputed Facts" since, as shown hereafter, it constituted plain error. 
B. An Error Exists. 
Rule 4-501(2)(a) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration requires that the 
movant's statement of material facts "shall specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the movant relies." Utah Code of Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(2)(a). It is undisputed 
that Roach's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" does not contain a single supporting reference 
to the record. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Roach because it 
expressly assumed that Roach had complied with Rule 4-501(2)(a). Record ("R.") at 11.-
Therefore, an error exists. 
-'(...continued) 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the 
context . . . . 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain 
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention 
of the court. 
Utah R. Evid. 103. 
5/
 A copy of the trial court's Memorandum Decision of April 21, 1993, which formed the basis 
of its later Order and Judgment granting the requested easement, is attached to Jex's opening 
appellate brief as Addendum "D." 
s:\bdr\45788 4 
C. The Error Should Have Been Obvious To The Trial Court. 
Even a cursory review of Roach's "Statement of Undisputed Facts" by the trial 
court would have revealed that it contains absolutely no supporting references to the record. 
Thus, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. 
D. The Error Is Harmful. 
The trial court granted summary judgment for Roach based on deemed 
admissions that it made pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b). R. at 77. Rule 4-501(2)(b) provides 
in relevant part that "[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose 
of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement." 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. R. 4-501(2)(b). The emphasized language is a direct incorporation 
of the requirements of Rule 4-501(2)(a). 
It follows from the unambiguous language of Rule 4-501(2)(b) that unless the 
movant first complies with Rule 4-501 (2)(a), then his statement of material facts cannot be 
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment regardless of whether it is 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. Ironically, the trial court 
misapplied Rule 4-501(2)(b) because it forgot that Roach had failed to comply with Rule 4-
501(2)(a). The trial court erroneously held: 
In his Statement of Undisputed Facts, [Roach] has set forth sufficient facts to 
establish each element [of his two causes of action]. Each factual assertion is 
supported by specific reference to affidavits and deposition testimony. In 
response, [Jex] has failed to adequately or competently refute any of [Roach's] 
material allegations of fact establishing his right of way. Her "Statement of 
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Facts" is wholly unsupported by any reference to the record. . . . Therefore, 
pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Code of Judicial Administration, [Roach's] 
assertions of fact relating to the second and fourth elements cited above must 
also be deemed admitted. 
R. at 77. 
There are, of course, no references to affidavits in Roach's "Statement of 
Undisputed Facts." R. at 23-24.^ Nor can references to deposition testimony be found 
anywhere in Roach's supporting memorandum. R. at 14-24. The trial court simply did not 
remember the contents of Roach's supporting memorandum.-7 
Of course without the benefit of these deemed admissions, Roach would not 
have prevailed on his motion for summary judgment. R. at 77. Therefore, Jex has clearly 
been harmed by the trial court's plain error. 
E. Rule 4-501 Requires Complete Compliance. 
Finally, there is no merit to Roach's argument that "substantial compliance" 
with Rule 4-501 is adequate. The purpose of Rule 4-501 is "[t]o establish a uniform 
procedure for filing motions, and supporting memoranda and documents with the court." 
Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501. Consistent with that purpose, the language of Rule 4-
501(2) is mandatory throughout. To allow substantial compliance would be to forgo 
- A copy of Roach's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
is attached to Jex's opening appellate brief as Addendum "C." 
- It is for precisely this reason that Jex questions the trial court's recent "correction" of the 
record. If the trial court could not remember the contents of Roach's supporting memorandum 
in April 1993 (when its Memorandum Decision was entered), then how could it remember the 
contents of that same document in November 1994, almost two years later? 
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uniformity and reduce the rule to a mere practice suggestion. There is nothing in the 
language of Rule 4-501 to indicate that it was intended to be a mere practice suggestion.-7 
H. ROACH'S RESPONSES CONCERNING THE ELEMENT OF REASONABLE 
NECESSITY FOR THE REQUESTED EASEMENT REFLECT A COMPLETE 
MISUNDERSTANDING OF JEX'S ARGUMENTS. 
A. Jex Has Not Waived Her Right To Object To Any Of The Trial Court's 
Findings. 
Roach contends that by specifically objecting to only the trial court's finding 
regarding the reasonable necessity of the requested easement, Jex has waived the right to 
object to any of the trial court's other findings. Apparently, Roach has chosen to ignore the 
plain error argument presented by Jex in her first issue which challenges all of the trial 
court's findings. Because the right to raise such plain error cannot be waived, Roach's 
waiver argument is meritless. 
B. Roach Fails To Recognize That Jex's Arguments Regarding Roach's 
Ownership Of A Leasehold Interest In The Jex Parcel Relate Only To 
Roach's Inability To Establish An Easement By Implication, Not An 
Easement By Necessity. 
The legal fiction of an easement by implication rests on the implied intent of 
the parties at the time of severance to continue a preexisting use of the servient estate. 
Tschaggeny v. Union Pac. Land Resources Corp., 555 P.2d 277, 280-81 (Utah 1976); 7 
David Thomas, Thompson on Real Property § 60.03(b)(5)(iii) (1994). The element of 
- Nor is there anything harsh about requiring a movant, such as Roach, to comply with 
Rule 4-501. If a movant loses his motion for failure to comply, then he can simply bring his 
motion into compliance and refile it. 
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tecessity in this context serves as evidence of the parties' intent to continue that 
lse. Id. § 60.03(b)(5)(iii). 
In the present case, it cannot be disputed that when unity of title was severed 
there was no immediate, reasonable necessity for the alleged preexisting use of Jex's parcel. 
Roach had already procured a leasehold interest in the Jex parcel which allowed him to 
traverse the Jex parcel at will. R. at 28.-; Thus, there was no immediate, reasonable 
necessity from which to imply the intent necessary to impose an easement by implication.—7 
This is not say that Roach will forever be required to lease the Jex parcel in 
order to access his parcel. On the contrary, if Roach could show that his parcel would 
ultimately become landlocked upon the expiration of the Jex lease, then he would be entitled 
to claim the benefit of another legal fiction, an easement by necessity. An easement by 
necessity rests on the implied intent of the parties at the time of severance to keep the 
dominant estate from becoming landlocked. Tschaggeny, 555 P.2d at 280-81; Thompson v. 
Schuh, 593 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Or. 1979) ("it is primarily of the nature of an ongoing 
- Roach's argument that the leasehold interest would take effect only after the moment of 
severance is hyper-technical. The law imposes an easement by implication in an attempt to 
uphold the parties' probable intent. Here, there was no need to impose this legal fiction since 
the parties' actual intent had been expressed — Roach would have the right to traverse Jex's 
parcel upon severance pursuant to his lease, not pursuant to an alleged preexisting use. 
Therefore, whatever immeasurable lapse of time occurred between severance and the leasehold 
taking effect is irrelevant and is certainly no justification for disregarding the parties' actual 
intent in favor of a legal fiction. 
— It should be noted that the imposition of an easement by implication is a very serious 
matter. Unlike an easement by necessity which expires when the underlying necessity expires, 
an easement by implication effects the servient estate forever. 7 David Thomas, Thompson on 
Real Property § 60.03(b)(5)(iii). 
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requirement"). Thus, if it was apparent at the time of severance that Roach might not always 
hold the Jex lease (which it undoubtedly was), then Roach would be entitled to an easement 
by necessity provided he could show that his parcel would otherwise become landlocked. 
As is shown in the next section, however, Roach has yet to prove as a matter 
of law that his parcel has ever been or will ever become landlocked. 
C. The Evidence Before The Trial Court Was Simply Insufficient To Show As 
Matter Of Law That Roach Has Been Denied Permission To Bridge The 
Canal. 
It is undisputed that from about 1991, Roach has gained access to his parcel by 
way of a bridge which he constructed across the East Bench Canal and has ceased using 
Jex's parcel as a means of accessing his parcel. R. at 69. — Nevertheless, Roach argues 
that by using this bridge he is a trespasser. 
The only evidence that Roach offers to show he is a trespasser is the Affidavit 
of J. Merrill Hallam, a representative of the East Bench Irrigation Company. R. at 30-
32.—' Mr. Hallam testified that to his knowledge the canal company has never given 
Roach express permission to bridge the canal. Id. However, consent to enter or remain on 
land "may be manifested by action or inaction" which need not be communicated to the 
actor. Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 167 cmt. a (1965). 
— A copy of the Affidavit of Bryan Jex is attached to Jex's opening appellate brief as 
Addendum "E." 
—' A copy of the Affidavit of J. Merrill Hallam is attached to Jex's opening appellate brief 
as Addendum "G." 
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The fact that Roach has bridged the canal and has used that bridge for the past 
three years without objection from the canal company raises at least a material question of 
fact concerning the canal company's implied consent. Inasmuch as a material question of 
fact remains as to whether Roach has truly been denied permission to bridge the canal, the 
trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Roach. 
ffl. WHETHER THE CANAL COMPANY COULD DENY ROACH PERMISSION 
TO BRIDGE THE CANAL WAS CLEARLY AN ISSUE BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
Roach argues that whether the canal company could deny him permission to 
bridge the canal was not an issue before the trial court, and therefore, cannot be raised on 
appeal. Roach's argument is contradicted by the trial court's express finding that "[t]he 
granting of permission to bridge the canal is obviously in the sole discretion and power of the 
[canal] company." R. at 76. Apparently, the trial court believed that this issue had been 
raised.—7 
Unfortunately, the trial correct made the wrong finding. A canal company 
does not possess unfettered discretion to deny a landowner access to his land. See Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 1946). Rather, it must act 
reasonably. Id. 
— The test for whether an issue will be considered on appeal has been stated as follows: 
"This Court will not consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the trial court and 
concerning which the trial court did not have an opportunity to make any findings of fact or 
law." Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). 
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The only evidence that Roach presented on this issue was testimony concerning 
problems that had arisen from bridges located on other property. Absolutely no evidence 
was presented as to the magnitude of these problems or that they are likely to occur on 
Roach's property. Thus, there was no way for the trial court to determine whether the canal 
company's alleged refusal to allow Roach to bridge the canal was reasonable even if it had 
correctly understood the law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein and in Jex's opening appellate brief, the trial 
court's Order and Judgment should be reversed. 
DATED this 11th day of January, 1995. 
(l^L<J^ (l)m V\M/Ynsy^^ 
Bruce D. Reemsnyder * 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
s:\bdr\45788 11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of January, 1995, I caused to be mailed 
via first-class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: 
John L. Valentine 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
fekuxA, OJ, V \M/Vrvywydj^\ 
s:\bdr\45788 12 

JOHN L. VALENTINE (3310), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street J:\jlv\roach.sup 
P.O. Box 778. Our File No. 21,015 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CORRECT AND 
MODIFY THE RECORD 
Case No. 920400425 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Paul J. Roach has moved this Court to correct or modify the record that is now before 
the Utah Court of Appeals in appeal 940059-CA. This Memorandum explains why that motion 
should be granted. 
Roach initially appeared before this Court in an action brought by him to settle the issue 
of whether he had an easement to cross Deanne Jex's land. He requested that the Court find that 
he had either an easement by implication or by prescription. In support of his claim, he 
submitted a Motion For Summary Judgment in which he presented affidavits and asserted that, 
based upon applicable law and the fact that no material facts were in dispute, he should be 
entitled as a matter of law to have an easement declared in his favor. 
This Court granted his motion, stating that he had sufficiently proved the elements of 
an easement by implication. See Memorandum Decision (Exhibit 1). In so concluding, the 
Court specifically noticed that Deanne Jex's attempts to rebut Roach's allegations were 
ineffectual. Specifically, the Court stated that she was unable to present any disputed material 
facts with respect to whether Paul Roach could secure permission to enter his land across the 
canal owned and operated by the East Bench Canal Company. 
Roach's allegations have now become the centerpoint of Jex's appeal. She claims that 
Roach made a technical oversight by failing to cite to the record or supporting affidavits in his 
numbered statement of facts. Her arguments are best summarized by referring to her amended 
docketing statement, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. When this amended docketing 
statement was filed, Roach immediately filed a Motion For Summary Disposition contending that 
the arguments surrounding the factual allegations had not been raised below and thus were 
barred upon appeal. Jex responded by contending that this Court committed plain error in ruling 
as it did because a page of those factual allegations was not before it. Thus, Jex concludes that 
even though she did not object below to Roach's oversight, that oversight, in combination with 
the fact that a page was missing from Roach's supporting memorandum, prevented this Court 
from ruling as it did without committing plain error. 
Roach now has moved this Court to correct or modify the record to reflect that when 
the Court was considering his Motion For Summary Judgment, it had before it all the pages of 
Roach's supporting memorandum. Rule 11(h) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that 
2 
"if any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, 
the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to 
the truth." Roach submits that this Court would not have disposed of Roach's motion as it did 
if material factual allegations were missing from Roach's supporting memorandum. Jex argues 
otherwise, stating in her response to Roach's Motion For Summary Disposition1 that "even a 
cursory reading of Roach's statement of undisputed facts by the trial court would have revealed 
that it was incomplete. An entire page was missing. . . . [This] error[ ] should have been 
obvious to the trial court." Appellant's Response to Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition 
in Memorandum In Support of Appellant's Motion To Strike at 8 (Exhibit 3). 
There is simply no basis for Jex's contention. Jex argues in her appeal that this Court 
violated not only applicable rules of judicial conduct but also applicable rules of common sense 
in ruling from an incomplete and nonsensical record. This Court simply would not have ruled 
as it did had a whole page of Roach's memorandum been missing, and therefore the documents 
before the Court must have been complete.2 
1
 Roach's Motion for Summary Disposition has been denied by the Court of Appeals, and the court 
is now holding the appeal for plenary review. 
2
 Even if the page was missing from the record, this Court had the ability to discern Roach's 
factual allegations and the factual bases for them by simply reading the body of the Memorandum. 
Citations to the record and affidavits occur there. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment at Bates Nos. 22-13 (Exhibit C to Jex's Opposition (Exhibit 3)). This 
argument-that this Court could have ruled on the record as it stands-goes beyond both Roach's 
procedural objection that Jex's argument was never raised below and the current motion to have the 
record corrected or modified. However, it underscores the fact that Jex's argument is spurious, and 
that this Court did not commit plain error. 
3 
This Court should grant Roach's motion. 
DATED this 2Ha day of October, 1994. 
JOHN L. VALENTINE, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this ^ f day of October, 1994. 
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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M. Byron Fisher, A1082 
Bruce D. Reemsnyder, A6021 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO CORRECT OR MODIFY 
THE RECORD 
No. 920400425 
Judge Ray M. Harding 
Defendant Deanne R. Jex ("Jex") responds to the Motion to Correct or Modify 
the Record filed by plaintiff Paul J. Roach ("Roach"). 
Jex has appealed this Court's Order and Judgment of March 15, 1994, on 
three separate grounds, only one of which is relevant to Roach's pending motion. The 
relevant ground is whether this Court could grant summary judgment based upon Roach's 
Statement of Undisputed Facts which failed to comply with Rule 4-501 (2)(a) of the Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
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Rule 4-501 (2)(a) requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a 
statement of undisputed material facts which is: (1) complete as to all of the elements 
necessary to establish his cause(s) of action and (2) supported by accurate references to the 
record. CJA Rule 4-501(2)(a). The movant's statement of undisputed material facts must be 
complete as to all of the necessary elements because CJA Rule 4-501 (2)(b) only permits the 
trial court to deem admitted those "[1] material facts set forth in the movant's statement and 
[2] properly supported by an accurate reference to the record." CJA Rule 4-501 (2)(b).i7 
The record in this case reveals that Roach filed a Statement of Undisputed 
material facts which set forth less than half of the material factual allegations necessary to 
establish his two causes of action. Record 23-24. In fact, the record reveals that Roach 
failed to file an entire page of his Statement of Undisputed Facts.-7 
Despite this error, Roach now asks this Court "to correct or modify the record 
to reflect that when the Court was considering his Motion for Summary Judgment, it had 
before it all the pages of Roach's supporting memorandum." The record plainly shows that 
this was not the case. Roach's request that this Court now concoct a new record for his 
benefit is outrageous. 
For a more thorough discussion of Jex's argument under CJA Rule 4-501(2), see Appellant's Response 
to Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition and Memorandum in Support of Appellant's Motion to Strike, a copy 
of which is attached to Roach's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Correct and Modify the Record. 
*' Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts contains five separately numbered paragraphs which begin with 
the number 1, then jump to number 8, then proceed in sequence to number 11. Record 23-34. It is obvious from the 
numbering of these paragraphs, as well as the numbering of the pages on which they appear, that the entire second page 
of Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts was never filed with this Court. Id. 
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Even if this Court could honestly grant Roach's request, it would not matter. 
Roach's Statement of Undisputed Facts still would not contain a single supporting reference 
to the record. Thus, Roach's failure to comply with the second requirement of CJA Rule 4-
501(2)(a) would continue to provide a basis for reversing the Order and Judgment. 
Finally, this Court should be aware that Jex has never accused this Court of 
violating any rule of judicial conduct in granting Roach's motion for summary judgment. 
Jex has merely argued that reversible error occurred. Roach's misstatement to the contrary 
is an simply attempt to bias this Court with respect to the pending motion and, therefore, 
should be ignored. 
For the reasons stated herein, Roach's Motion to Correct or Modify the 
Record must be denied. 
DATED this S day of November, 1994. 
M. Byron Fisher 
Bruce D. Reemsnyder 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 6 day of November, 1994, I caused to be 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Correct or Modify the Record, to: 
John L. Valentine 
Howard, Lewis & Petersen 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84606 
//c^ucx- ([/. \j \M/r^A>^y^ 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL J. ROACH, 
vs. 
DEANNE R. JEX, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 920400425 
DATE: November 10, 1994 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Laura Cabanilla 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court for consideration of Plaintiffs Motion to Correct 
and Modify the Record. Having received and considered memorandum both in support and 
opposition to the motion, the Court hereby grants the motion and finds as follows: 
The Court finds that when it was considering Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it had before it all the pages of Roach's supporting memorandum. Further, even 
had the page been missing, the factual bases to the allegations would have been apparent to 
the Court simply by reading the body of the Memorandum for Summary Judgment. 
As rule 11(h) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that, "if any difference 
arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the differnce 
shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth." 
Therefore, the Court hereby orders that the record be corrected to reflect that when the 
Court reviewed the Motion and Memorandum for Summary Judgment in this matter, it had 
before it all the pages to that document. 
Dated this 10th day of November, 1994, 
cc: John L. Valentine, Esq. 
M. Byron Fisher, Esq. 
